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ABSTRACT 
Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance    
by Benny Geys and Kai A. Konrad  
Countries differ in their governmental architectures and in the rules that 
describe the allocation of tasks, rights and duties across the various levels of 
government. In this paper, we present a short and selective survey of the 
development of the theory of optimal allocation of rights and duties along the 
vertical dimension in federations. We thereby first discuss the multiple trade-offs 
brought forward in the literature; these make that an ideal allocation of actual 
tasks across levels of government may be difficult, if not impossible, to attain.  
Then we turn to the consequences of a sub-optimal allocation of tasks and 
discuss spillover effects, strategic interactions between jurisdictions and inter-
governmental competition. Throughout the review, we highlight paths in need of 
further research such that, in time, we will have a more solid ground for policy 
advice. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Föderalismus und optimale Allokation über Regierungsebenen  
Staaten unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich ihres Regierungsaufbaus und ihren 
Verteilungsregeln von Aufgaben, Rechten und Pflichten über die verschiedenen 
Regierungsebenen hinweg.  In diesem Artikel stellen wir eine kurze und selek-
tive Übersicht über die Entwicklung der Theorie der optimalen Allokation von 
Rechten und Pflichten entlang der vertikalen Dimension in Staatenbünden vor. 
Wir diskutieren dabei zuerst die vielfachen, in der Literatur beschriebenen, 
Trade-offs. Diese führen dazu, dass eine ideale Verteilung der tatsächlichen 
Aufgaben schwierig, wenn nicht unmöglich zu erzielen ist. Als nächstes wenden 
wir uns den Konsequenzen der sub-optimalen Aufgabenverteilung zu und disku-
tieren externe Effekte, strategische Interaktionen zwischen den verschiedenen  
Gebietskörperschaften und zwischenstaatlichen Wettbewerb. Im gesamten 
Überblicksartikel stellen wir mögliche Pfade für notwendige weitere Forschung 
heraus, mit der für die Zukunft eine solide Grundlage für Politikberatung gelegt 
werden kann.   
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1. Introduction 
Countries differ in their governmental architectures and in the rules that describe the 
allocation of tasks, rights and duties across the various levels of government. Figure 1 
displays the architecture of two (hypothetical) countries by way of illustration. Country A on 
the left-hand side has two levels of government: a central government at the highest level and 
many small jurisdictions at the lower level. Country B on the right-hand side has three layers 
of government: a central government at the highest level, two ‘regional’ governments 
representing an ‘intermediate’ level of government and several small jurisdictions at the third 
and lowest level. Clearly, these are only two possible constellations. Treisman (2000) 
analyses a large set of countries and finds government architectures involving between one 
(Singapore) and six layers of government (Russia). Many of these real-world government 
architectures are (significantly) more complicated than the ones depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Two possible government architectures 
 
federal
regional
local
 
  
Moreover, countries’ government architectures are not static, but subject to often substantial 
change. Such reforms are habitually the focus of intense political debates. 
‘Föderalismusreform’ I (in 2006) and II (in 2008) in Germany and the debates about a further 
reorganization (or, more specifically, regionalization) of the government architecture in 
Belgium since the federal elections of June 2007 are illustrative. Similar debates exist also in 
many developing countries, and are high on the agenda of international organizations such as 
the World Bank or the IMF, which often act as consultants in the transformation process of 
developing countries. The development process of the European Union – with debates on the 
EU constitution, EU enlargement and the transfer of powers from the national to the EU level 
(e.g., concerning a common social, fiscal or foreign policy) – represents an important example 
of the fluidity of governmental architectures at the international level. Further, it illustrates 
that the nation state itself may be imbedded into larger governmental structure, with the 
European Union and international organizations being prominent examples (see, e.g., Zürn 
2000, 2004).1 
 
Interestingly, opinions concerning the instigating forces of these reform debates differ. Bolton 
and Roland (1997) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003) argue such debates are a consequence of 
increased globalization. Others, however, argue that globalization hinders decentralisation 
(Garrett and Rodden 2003). The theory of federalism needs to address both positive and 
normative questions regarding the choice of governmental architecture and the assignment of 
                                                 
1  In what follows we disregard important distinctions such as, for instance, between a federation of nations and 
a federal state, and focus on the intergovernmental issues that emerge within the same layer or between 
different layers of government in such structures and are common to both structures. 
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tasks, rights, responsibilities etc. among different government levels.2 These include, but are 
not limited to, the assignment of a) rights to choose, collect, or spend different types of taxes, 
b) rights to issue debt and the responsibilities for repayment of debt within the federation, c) 
decision rights on public expenditures for goods that benefit only a subgroup within the 
federation (local public goods) and d) expenditures that affect all members of the federation 
(nationwide public goods). While these four examples are confined to the rights to tax and 
spend, similar choices concerning the optimal allocation of tasks obviously also apply to 
regulation of public issues more generally: e.g., education, environmental issues, cultural 
policy, defense, police and so on. Moreover, governance rules and the interdependencies and 
structure of democratic decision-making (division of power, election rules, etc.) must be 
chosen or designed. Still, for ease of exposition, we refer mainly to fiscal policies in what 
follows. The reason is that this is a theme most often returned to in the (fiscal) federalism 
literature. Nonetheless, it is important for the reader to keep in mind that the arguments 
presented are usually of a much more general nature and apply to the ‘assignment problem’ in 
a broad sense (and not just to the ‘fiscal frame’ within which they are presented). 
 
We first start with a standard analysis of what is known as Oates’ Decentralization Theorem 
(Oates 1972), which highlights an important trade-off in these allocation decisions.3 Even 
though this theorem does not provide the ultimate answers, it is useful as a frame of reference 
or point of departure. Also, it evened the ground for what Oates (2005) and Weingast (2006) 
call ‘Second Generation Fiscal Federalism’, which allowed analysis of aspects such as 
commitment power, time consistency issues and problems of information, as well as 
differences in political decision-making on different levels of government. Then, we discuss 
problems related to suboptimal task assignment (in section 3) and departures from the 
uniformity assumption made in Oates’ (1972) analysis (in section 4). Finally, in section 5, we 
briefly elaborate on strategic effects of country’s decentralization in the international sphere.  
 
Overall, the short and necessarily selective survey offered in the present chapter illustrates 
that the theory of optimal allocation of rights and duties in federations cannot provide 
unambiguous one-size-fits-all recommendations. Especially the more recent contributions to 
this vast and fast-developing literature – based on insights derived from contract theory and 
political economy – clearly show that various trade-offs need to be considered 
simultaneously. As such, it is clear that the decentralization question is not resolved easily, 
suggesting that bold policy recommendations are unwarranted at this stage, and that more 
work is needed to develop a more solid ground for policy advice. 
 
2. The Decentralization Theorem 
The public sector is generally involved in a wide variety of tasks, including, for instance, 
social security, health care, defense, education and welfare benefits. Which level of 
government should take up a given task? In a very influential study, Oates (1972) provided an 
answer based on the observation that some public goods – such as national defense – benefit 
the entire population of a country, while others – such as local parks or street lighting – 
mostly benefit the population of a very small region within a country (and might entail 
spillover effects). With this in mind, Oates argued that ‘the provision of public services 
should be located at the lowest level of government encompassing […] the relevant benefits 
and costs’ (Oates, 1999: 1122; see also Musgrave, 1959; Tullock, 1969; Breton and Scott, 
                                                 
2  The discussion on the division of tasks and power across different levels of government is known as the 
‘assignment problem’ (e.g., Stigler 1957; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972, 1999; McLure 1983; Inman and 
Rubinfeld 1997; Tanzi 2002). 
3  See, for instance, Rosen (1988), Hindriks and Myles (2006), or Blankart (2008). 
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1978, for early contributions to this debate and, for an overview, Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997). 
This idea became generally known as the Decentralization Theorem and underlies, for 
example, the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union.  
 
To see how Oates’ ‘solution’ comes about, consider Figure 2 where we depict public 
provision of the per-capita quantity of a good E in a country G. Country G consists of two 
(equal-sized) regions G1 and G2. Provision of the good can either be taken up by the national 
government or by the governments of the two regions. Importantly, while the population of 
the country is split evenly across both regions and preferences for the publicly provided good 
are homogenous within each region, inhabitants of region G2 have a stronger preference for 
the good than those in region G1. To fix ideas, one could think of the good E as education, and 
the population in region G1 consisting of only elderly people while that in region G2 is 
dominated by young families. Naturally, residents of region G2 would, for any given price, 
demand more of the good than those of region G1 (who might be more interested in social 
provisions for the elderly). This is reflected in the ‘demand curve’ for region G2 (denoted 
DG2) lying further to the upper left corner compared to that of region G1 (denoted DG1). 
 
Figure 2: Graphical representation decentralization theorem 
 
For simplicity, assume that the good can be produced at a constant cost C per unit and per 
user (which is also the price charged to inhabitants, e.g., via taxes). At this price, region G1 
would demand quantity EG1, while region G2 would prefer to consume EG2. Under central 
undifferentiated provision, however, each region would obtain E*. This is clearly 
unsatisfactory for both regions. Region G2 cannot fully exploit its consumer surplus, while 
region G1 suffers a ‘coercion loss’ from being provided with too much of the good (or, more 
precisely, a good it cares too little for). These welfare losses are represented by triangles z and 
y respectively. These welfare losses become larger as the preferences of both regions diverge 
further. Under regional provision, on the other hand, such welfare losses do not occur as each 
region will supply the amount demanded by its population. Hence, when preferences differ 
across regions and benefits of a public good are local, provision should be ‘located at the 
lowest level of government encompassing […] the relevant benefits and costs’ (Oates 1999: 
1122) to avoid welfare losses. 
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Through his analysis, Oates was the first to point at an important and intuitively evident trade-
off between i) interregional spillovers and a lack of full internalization on the local level on 
the one side, and ii) a tendency of the central government to be ‘remote’ from, and inattentive 
to, local needs on the other side. He thereby initiated a research program that studies questions 
deriving from this fundamental trade-off with the tools of modern incentive theory, contract 
theory and the theory of political economy. In what follows, we will go deeper into several 
questions that have received particular attention. 
 
Still, before we do so, it should be pointed out that Oates’ initial analysis clearly does not 
provide final answers. Indeed, the above line of argument rests strongly on the assumption 
that the central government is itself unable to differentiate the supply of the public good 
across both regions. This evidently is a very strong assumption. Nevertheless, in its absence, it 
becomes unclear whether centralized or decentralized provision is preferable from a welfare 
point of view. One early scholarly debate following the analyses of Tiebout (1956), Musgrave 
(1959), Tullock (1969), Oates (1972), Breton and Scott (1978) and Bewley (1981) therefore 
tried to generate deeper insights concerning the conditions under which decentralization may 
be beneficial – or not. Among the arguments discussed are information asymmetry and 
increasing returns.  
 
Standard arguments raised when discussing decentralization often stress that state and local 
governments, being closer to the public, tend to be more responsive, accountable and aware of 
the preferences of their constituents than the central government (Oates 1999; Tanzi 2002). If 
the local government has information about local preferences, taxable income or other 
relevant variables which is not available to the central government, this can potentially cause 
principal-agent problems between the local and the central government.4 Decentralization of 
local public good supply and its financing may then be a natural design.5 This asymmetric 
information assumption has, however, been criticized on a deeper theoretical ground (see, 
e.g., Lockwood 2006: 38). If information is available at the local level, there typically exist 
information revelation mechanisms which a benevolent central government could use to 
obtain this information. In cases where the central government has sufficient enforcement 
power, it can even implement very inexpensive revelation mechanisms (e.g., the ‘shoot the 
liar’ mechanism), as it is typically true that several players at the local level have the relevant 
information.  
 
A second argument concerns economies of scale in the production of a given public good and 
internalization of externalities. When local, small-scale production of the public good is much 
more expensive than central, large-scale production, it may be beneficial to organize 
provision of the public good at a higher level of government. Spillovers from local policies 
reinforce this point. Central governments are likely to internalize such inter-jurisdictional 
externalities, whereas local governments have no incentive to do so. Such spillovers can be 
important in policy areas as, e.g., police protection or pollution abatement. Hence, scale 
economies and spillovers appear to go against decentralization. Nonetheless, regions may 
                                                 
4  Contributions that follow this line of argument are, for instance, Bucovetsky, Marchand and Pestieau (1998), 
Cornes (2000), Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001), Huber and Runkel (2006) and Breuillé and Gary-
Bobo (2007). 
5  Nonetheless, complete information about citizens’ preferences is unlikely even at the local level. In the 
theoretical model, revelation of preferences can be achieved by introducing mobility (cf. Tiebout 1956). 
People then sort themselves according to their preferences and all such information is revealed. Overall, 
however, the theoretical assumptions required for an efficient outcome are considerable (see, e.g., Bewley 
1981). Moreover, in practice, lack of expertise or training as well as ‘administrative weaknesses at the sub-
national level’ may do much to counteract the benefits of decentralisation (Ter-Minassian 1997: 22; see also 
Geys and Moesen 2008a).  
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cooperate and purchase the public good from the same supplier, which would be able to 
exhaust economies of scale. When such cooperation is feasible, decentralization may still be 
viable even under the presence of significant economies of scale. 
 
3. Losses from suboptimal task assignment 
While many theories have been developed from the normative point of view (i.e. arguing how 
tasks should ideally be allocated), an ideal allocation of actual tasks across levels of 
government is difficult, if not impossible, to attain. One reason is that the presiding allocation 
of tasks is often the result of historical incidents (or ‘critical junctures’) and path dependence 
(in the spirit of Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000). It may be less than ideal (and all parties 
involved might even agree about this point), but it will be hard to change the existing 
configuration since no level of government is (usually) very willing to give up tasks and/or 
see its influence reduced. Related, central governments often are found to benefit from an 
‘attraction of power’ known as Popitz’s Law, in which they exploit their ‘constitutional power 
[…] to take over state tax legislation’ (Blankart 2000: 27; see also Vaubel 1994; Grossman 
and West 1994). This implies that even when an ideal allocation of powers could be reached 
at some point, this need not be an equilibrium that is easily maintained. 
 
Another reason is that the trade-off between ‘closeness’ to local needs and potential for 
spillovers is difficult to resolve in practice. For example, some police tasks (such as local 
traffic regulation) can probably be safely assigned to local governments. However, other 
aspects of police enforcement (such as prevention of drug trafficking) are likely to entail 
considerable spillovers to other jurisdictions, which may ask for an assignment of this task to 
a higher level of government. Resolving such problems by the creation of two independent 
types of police may also not be optimal, as there may be economies of scope.6 Similarly, local 
measures against environmental pollution may improve the environment in neighboring 
jurisdictions. Medical, recreational, cultural or educational facilities can be used by citizens of 
neighbouring jurisdictions. Generous welfare programs may attract recipients from 
neighbouring jurisdictions. Finally, local taxes have externalities due to mobile tax bases. As 
shown by Mansoorian and Myers (1993), sometimes local politicians may internalize some of 
these externalities fully. When such interregional externalities are not, or only partially, 
accounted for, underinvestment in policies with positive externalities and overinvestment in 
policies with negative externalities may, but need not, occur in the absence of negotiations. A 
‘race to the bottom’ may materialize (see, e.g., Brueckner 2000, 2003; Fredriksson and 
Millimet 2002).7 
  
Spillover problems can be remedied by allocating the task to a central government, which 
internalizes the externalities and makes the optimal (collective) decision. Also, 
intergovernmental grants that are governed by the central government and distributed to the 
local governments, can remedy such problems. Such grants have indeed been recurrently 
                                                 
6  Related, the allocation of tasks that minimizes social welfare losses may entail a proliferation of local 
governments of different size for the various public goods with different regional outreach. Indeed, assuming 
that geographic spillovers of no two public goods are equal, the decentralization principle states that each 
public good should be provided by a different level of government (Mueller 2003). More intuitively, if 
everyone lives in his/her own region and decides individually on public good provision, there is no 
heterogeneity of preferences within each region. It follows from Figure 2 that there will likewise be no 
welfare losses in such a setting. While clearly taking the issue to its limit, it illustrates that optimal allocation 
of tasks is likely to be untenable in reality as it would induce enormous administration and coordination 
costs. As a result, allocation of tasks is – in reality – likely to be imperfect most of the time in most countries 
(or regions). 
7  We return more extensively to such inter-governmental competition below. 
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argued to help at internalizing spillover benefits from given policy decisions. However, their 
use is not entirely unproblematic. The design of these transfer schemes should be faced with 
due care (Inman 1999; Bird and Smart 2002). Matching grants, earmarked grants and block 
grants may affect jurisdictions’ expenditures in different ways. Also, intergovernmental 
transfers may not invoke the same response from local politicians as increases in self-
generated revenues (for instance, from local taxes). Theoretically, and using a median voter 
model, Bradford and Oates (1971) show that unconditional (or ‘block’) intergovernmental 
grants and private income should have equivalent effects on local public spending (since 
block grants only have an income effect). Empirical studies, however, fail to substantiate this 
prediction: grants often strongly increase public spending while private income mostly fails to 
do so (e.g., Gramlich and Galper 1973; Heyndels and Smolders 1994; Heyndels 2001; or, for 
a review, Hines and Thaler 1995). This phenomenon has become known as the ‘flypaper 
effect’ and indicates that the incentive structure of block grants needs to be carefully 
considered when introducing such schedules.8 
 
Rather than for the internalisation of spillovers (or promoting spending on certain public 
goods), grants can also be used to increase fiscal equality between various governments. 
Providing grants through such fiscal equalization schemes is extensively employed in 
countries such as Canada and Germany and may ‘limit tax competition among subnational 
governments [and] correct fiscal externalities’ (Bucovetsky and Smart 2006: 119). However, 
less positive, they may at the same time distort incentives for local governments to increase 
local economic growth (Weingast 2006) as well as increase government spending 
(Bucovetsky and Smart 2006). Grants can create incentives for local jurisdictions that may or 
may not be fully in line with those desired by the granting higher-level government. An 
efficient provision of services requires transfers to be designed such that ‘those receiving 
them have a clear mandate, adequate resources, sufficient flexibility to make decisions and are 
accountable for results’ (Bird and Smart 2002: 899). Given its importance, the optimal design 
of the financial structure within a federal state and the incentives this provides to local-
government officials remains a hot topic of research to date. 
 
Governments of local jurisdictions generally do not act in isolation, passively suffering from, 
or imposing externalities on others, but they interact strategically along many dimensions, 
including tax rates (for reviews, see Wilson 1999; Fuest, Huber and Mintz 2005), welfare 
benefit levels (for a review, see Brueckner 2003), environmental standards (e.g., Oates and 
Schwab 1988; Fredriksson and Millimet 2002), drug policy (e.g., Konrad 1994) and law 
enforcement (for a review, see Teichmann 2005). Also, the interdependence may derive from 
various sources (which are empirically hard to disentangle e.g., Brueckner 2003; Allers and 
Elhorst 2005; Werck, Heyndels and Geys 2008). One source is externalities among welfare-
oriented governments in strategic games. Second, in political competition, yardstick 
competition (cf. Shleifer 1985) may develop when voters use neighbouring jurisdictions to 
assess the quality of their own incumbents – and re-elect or substitute them accordingly (e.g., 
                                                 
8  An alternative interpretation – although not unequivocally implied by the flypaper effect – is that the public 
sector suffers fewer inhibitions to spend grant revenues than funds obtained from private income. The latter 
interpretation suggests that revenues from intergovernmental grants might be spent less carefully (or more 
inefficiently) than revenues from, say, local taxation (see De Borger et al. 1994; De Borger and Kerstens 
1996). The reason is that the cost of such inefficiencies falls on a much broader constituency (Silkman and 
Young 1982). Studies on public sector (in)efficiency have provided some empirical support for this view by 
uncovering a strong (and mostly negative) relation between grants and government efficiency (e.g., Silkman 
and Young 1982; De Borger et al. 1994; De Borger and Kerstens 1996; Grossman et al. 1999; Worthington 
2000; Bishop and Brand 2003; Geys and Moesen, 2008b; Kalb, 2008). 
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Salmon 1987; Besley and Case 1995; Bivand and Szymanski 1997).9 Finally, Ashworth and 
Heyndels (2000) argue that the use of neighbouring governments’ policies as a reference 
point generates so-called transaction (dis)utility to voters (Thaler 1985). As this transaction 
utility is likely to also affect voting behaviour, the (rational) response of politicians is to 
follow each other’s lead (e.g., Ashworth and Heyndels 2000; Geys 2006).  
 
The existence of these spatial interactions between jurisdictions at the same level of 
government is by now generally acknowledged (for reviews, see Brueckner 2003; Revelli 
2005). Whether or not this intergovernmental competition leads to more efficient 
governments is, however, a mute point of discussion (e.g., Belleflamme and Hindriks 2005; a 
similar discussion exists for the relation between the extent of expenditure decentralization, 
legal autonomy and efficiency; see, e.g., Barankay and Lockwood 2007). Sinn (1997), for 
example, argues that tax competition, and fiscal competition more generally, is dysfunctional 
between lower levels of government if the respective governments are assigned tasks that, 
from an allocation point of view, should be assigned to them. On the other hand, it has been 
shown that more/less efficient jurisdictions tend to have more/less efficient neighbours as well 
(see, e.g., Geys 2006; Revelli and Tovmo 2007). This suggests that efficiency is used as a 
competitive device between local governments, and tends to lead to better performance. A 
similar finding can be distilled from recent work by Revelli (2008), who shows that 
performance of British local jurisdictions improved strongly after (relative) performance 
ratings by the central government were made public.  
 
It is important to mention at this point that most studies in this field concentrate on 
‘horizontal’ competition between jurisdictions at the same level of government. In reality, 
however, interaction obviously also occurs between governments of different levels (i.e. 
vertically). Despite the real-world importance of such vertical interdependence, the effect of 
overlapping competencies across levels (i.e. in a vertical sense) has received relatively little 
emphasis in the foregoing federalism literature (e.g., Curry, 2006) – with some important 
exceptions.10 Solé-Ollé and Esteller-Moré (2001) and Devereux et al. (2007), for example, 
show that the vertical dimension of intergovernmental relations is important for excise 
taxation in the US (other empirical tests of vertical rather than horizontal tax competition 
include Besley and Rosen 1998; Revelli 2003; Andersson, Aronsson and Wikstrom 2004; 
Brülhart and Jametti 2006; Rizzo 2007). Kessing, Konrad and Kotsogiannis (2006, 2008) 
develop theoretical arguments for why vertical competition may deter foreign direct 
investment and Kessing, Konrad and Kotsogiannis (2007) find empirical evidence in line with 
these arguments. Also, Withers (1979) and Jenkins and Austen-Smith (1987) study the 
relation between public cultural spending by different levels of government (arguing that, say, 
federal arts outlays in a given jurisdiction affect state and local expenditures in that same 
jurisdiction). Interestingly, however, in the European integration literature in Political 
Science, a long-standing debate concerns the question whether European integration 
‘hollowed out’ or strengthened the individual nation states within the Union (see, e.g., 
Milward, 1992; Marks, 1993; Moravcsik, 1994; Zürn, 1996). 
 
                                                 
9  Specifically, performance of politicians in other jurisdictions may be used to detect ‘bad’ types of politicians, 
even though they may try to mimic ‘good’ politicians. That is, federalism and the interjurisdictional 
comparison it allows the generation of useful (comparative) information that makes it easier to discern 
whether poor performance is due to bad luck or to bad behavior (even when exogenous shocks that affect 
politicians’ performance are correlated). 
10  For a discussion of vertical and horizontal tax competition, see Keen (1998), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) 
and Wrede (1997, 2000).  
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Likewise, interactions in the form of so-called “multi-level games” (based on the initial 
contribution concerning two-level games by Putnam, 1988) have not been extensively dealt 
with in the federalism literature. In this respect, federalism scholarship diverges to an 
important extent from the extensive literature on “multi-level governance” (MLG), which 
analyses “contemporary structures in EU Europe as consisting of overlapping authorities and 
competing competencies” (Aalberts, 2004, 23). Future research would in our view certainly 
benefit from a further integration of insights from the MLG-literature with respect to the 
vertical ‘coordination’ or ‘competition’ between levels of jurisdictions into the federalism 
literature (which has predominantly concentrated on the horizontal dimension of competition 
between jurisdictions).  
 
4. Departures from ‘uniformity by assumption’ 
A cornerstone assumption for Oates’ decentralization rule is uniformity of public good 
provision by the central government. Lockwood (2002: 313) suggests that this assumption is 
‘not consistent with the evidence in that, typically, spending by central governments is not 
uniform across regions in per capita terms’ and in his (2006: 38) survey, he concludes that the 
uniformity assumption is ‘clearly incorrect’. This may point to the fact that vertical 
decentralization involves more than the uniformity-versus-spillovers trade-off. In this section, 
we therefore briefly discuss findings from a recent branch of the political economy literature, 
which, strongly influenced by contract theory, considers different trade-offs which emerge 
from the institutional structure of governments.  
 
Lockwood (2002), for example, assumes that centralized policy-making occurs through an 
assembly of delegates from all regions. The assembly decides about (possibly non-uniform) 
provision of public goods in the different regions, which is financed by an income tax that is 
uniform across regions. The legislative rules within the assembly are clearly important, and he 
discusses several modes of legislative rules. In doing so, a trade-off emerges between 
spillovers that occur in a decentralized assignment and the difficulties in the legislative 
process of centralized decision-making. Note that uniform treatment of all regions may occur 
in the equilibrium, but as an outcome, not by assumption. A consideration of the political 
decision making process on the regional level may also be important. Ihori and Yang (2008) 
apply a citizen candidate model for the election of the decision maker on the local level. They 
show that heterogeneity of capital ownership on the regional level may lead to strategic 
citizen candidate choices of higher capital income taxes than in a framework with politicians 
who maximize the welfare of the region. This can counterbalance the effects of tax 
competition. 
 
Accountability of politicians becomes an important subject in a political economy framework. 
An interesting accountability problem may emerge even when a) all politicians are ex-ante 
identical, b) have incentives to behave selfishly, and c) the only mechanism for inducing them 
to perform well is the re-election mechanism. Seabright (1996) essentially exploits insights 
gained from the study of the organization of firms to address this problem. He starts from the 
observation that ‘contracts’ between voters and politicians are incomplete, giving politicians 
an incentive to behave opportunistically. The only way a voter can sanction a politician is by 
not re-electing him/her for a second period. In a decentralized country, each jurisdiction has 
an incumbent politician who decides about the policy in this jurisdiction. Under 
centralization, however, one politician makes many policy choices (i.e. one for each 
jurisdiction). As the politician needs only the votes from a majority of jurisdictions to be re-
elected, (s)he needs to behave accountably only to a majority of jurisdictions and can extort 
the remaining jurisdictions. The reason is that the latter are unable to exert any sanction given 
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that they are in a minority position. One might call this a redundancy effect. Some 
jurisdictions and their votes become redundant to the politician. Instead of behaving 
accountably vis-à-vis these, the politician may take advantage of them.  
  
Seabright’s insight concerning the risk faced by multiple jurisdictions submitting to a 
centralized system with majoritarian re-election has instigated significant further research. 
Wrede (2006), for example, illustrates that a uniformity requirement may be a countermeasure 
to undesirable implications of the redundancy effect. Cai and Treisman (2008) consider 
governments’ incentives for experimentation and innovation (see also Strumpf, 2002; 
Ashworth et al., 2006). With decentralized decision-making, each incumbent politician 
decides about whether to experiment in his jurisdiction, weighing the benefits and costs. 
Experimenting has a cost borne by the politician and the jurisdiction, but may have positive 
spillovers for other jurisdictions (as these may imitate successful experiments). As a result, 
there is a tendency for too little experimentation if this is decided decentrally. If, instead, a 
central politician chooses the number of different experiments and allocates these among 
various jurisdictions, the politician benefits from making use of successful experiments in 
other jurisdictions. Hence, the central politician is more able to internalize the positive 
spillovers from local experimentation. Also, the politician may be willing to run experiments 
in some jurisdictions (i.e. depart from uniformity of policies across jurisdictions), even if 
these experiments are unlikely to be successful and very unpopular among the voters in this 
jurisdiction, simply because the votes of this jurisdiction may be redundant, and not needed 
for his re-election.  
 
5. Strategic international effects of a country’s decentralization 
So far, we have discussed the allocation of tasks or decision power within a country in 
isolation. However, countries, whether they are centralized or comprise of many vertical 
layers of government, interact with other countries. The allocation of tasks within a country 
has implications for a country’s performance in the strategic interaction with other countries. 
In particular, a particular federal structure may yield commitment for this country in a 
strategic game with other countries, and depending on the nature of the strategic game, this 
commitment can be beneficial or detrimental. 
 
Wilson and Janeba (2005) apply this idea to international tax competition. They show that a 
suitable delegation of tasks inside one country and decentralized tax financing of these tasks 
provides desirable commitment in this context. It has a strategic effect on the tax choices in 
other countries and may lead to an equilibrium with higher welfare. Kessing, Konrad and 
Kotsogiannis (2006, 2007, 2008) apply the same general logic to the competition between 
countries for foreign direct investment (FDI). They show that the allocation of taxation rights 
and policy decision-making along several vertical layers of government is disadvantageous 
for the country. For instance, if several levels of government jointly contribute to the 
subsidies offered to a potential foreign direct investor, then the governments from the 
different levels face a collective action problem. Also, when the governments from the 
different levels decide about taxing business activity, vertical tax externalities may lead to 
sub-optimally high taxes. These two effects also reinforce each other and jointly make the 
country less able to attract foreign direct investment in a competition with other countries. 
They also find strong empirical support for their theory.  
 
Strategic effects of a different kind also emerge from centralizing or decentralizing decision 
rights for policies that have interregional and international spillovers. Among the examples 
that have been analysed are fiscal stabilization policy (Sørensen 1996), environmental policy 
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(Buchholz, Haslbeck and Sandler 1998) and capital income tax policy (Konrad and 
Schjelderup 1999). Decentralization of decision-making for these policies in one country 
tends to change the country’s total activity level. In an international context, this change in 
behavior is anticipated by other countries, and the governments in these other countries may, 
in response, adjust their own activity level. Consider, by way of example, activities against 
global warming – e.g., CO²-emission reductions – in Europe. Allocating emission reduction 
legislation to the European level may lead to substantial emission reductions in Europe (e.g., 
because such a coordinated solution may reduce free-rider effects). As a result, the need for 
emission reductions in non-European becomes lower. Anticipating the amount of emission 
reduction by European countries, the equilibrium reaction of non-European countries is to 
choose little emission reduction. On the other hand, allocation of decisions on emission 
reduction inside the EU to national or even regional governments will imply that none of 
these governments will engage very actively in reduction policy. The reason is that each will 
attempt to free-ride on others decisions, and invest too little in its own emission reduction. 
Anticipating that Europe will not reduce emissions by much, non-European countries may 
then feel that they need to reduce emissions more strongly.  
 
These examples show that the international perspective must be added to gain a more 
complete picture of the optimal allocation of rights and duties in a federation. 
Decentralization or centralization decisions that might have desirable properties for the 
functioning of a country in isolation are likely to affect the interaction of the country as a 
whole with other countries in the international arena. These effects may go in the same 
direction as regards welfare, or may point into the opposite direction.  
 
6. Summary 
In this chapter we gave a short and selective survey of the development of the theory of 
optimal allocation of rights and duties along the vertical dimension in federations. The results 
showed that the message derived from this theory is not clear. Multiple trade-offs became 
visible, in particular in the more recent developments drawing on contract theory and political 
economy: e.g., between the potential for interregional spillovers and ‘closeness to local needs 
or between spillovers in a decentralized assignment and the difficulties in the legislative 
process of centralized decision-making. These multiple trade-offs make that, in realty, an 
ideal allocation of actual tasks across levels of government might be difficult, if not 
impossible, to attain. Moreover, even if attained, scholars have pointed to strong forces which 
might make such a situation difficult to sustain over time. 
 
Clearly, a sub-optimal allocation of tasks entails that there might be spillover effects across 
jurisdictions. While intergovernmental grants (governed by the central government and 
distributed to the local governments) may be used to remedy such spillover problems, the 
federalism literature has shown that such grants are not miracle solutions and involve 
significant problems of their own. Indeed, this ‘remedy’ requires careful planning and 
deliberation, and the optimal design of intergovernmental grants as well as the incentives they 
generate for local-government officials remains a hot topic of research to date.  
 
If left unresolved, spillovers between local jurisdictions may engender various forms of 
strategic interaction or inter-governmental competition. To date, opinions vary concerning 
whether or not such competition leads to more or less efficient (local) governments – and 
more work is clearly needed on this topic. Also, most studies have thus far focused on 
‘horizontal’ competition (i.e. between jurisdictions at the same level of government), while 
vertical interdependence has been relatively neglected. However, such vertical interactions are 
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a reality and the federalism literature would do well to more extensively discuss their causes 
and consequences. One potential means to do so would be through integration of insights 
from the MLG-literature and the theory of “multi-level games” into the federalism literature. 
 
With the advent of the “second generation” fiscal federalism literature, more attention has 
been awarded to incentives, goals and opportunities of local public officials rather than 
assuming them to be benevolent (as was the case in the early stages of the fiscal federalism 
literature). However, this literature is, in a sense, only in its infancy and more work is clearly 
needed on aspects such as commitment power, time consistency issues and problems of 
information. We also need to know more about, for example, the effects of (differences in) 
political decision-making processes on various levels of government, political accountability 
and the effects of (de)centralisation in one country on the strategic interactions between 
countries. Overall, the present survey therefore showed that the decentralization question is 
not resolved easily, suggesting that bold policy recommendations are unwarranted at this 
stage, and that more work is needed to develop a more solid ground for policy advice. 
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